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THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
A Monthly Law Review
"Law is the perfection of human-reason"

Volume I

November, 1925

Number 1

THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES AND
ADULT PROBATION IN THE CHANCERY
COURT
By BEN B. LINDSEY.

This is the first of two artildes by Judge Lindsey.

The second will appear

in the next issue of The Notre Dame Lawyer.
The principle of probation, as applied to offenders against the
state--whether such offenders be adults or minors--was originally
applied in a limited, way to proceedings in criminal courts. As with
all reforms, it came first in a rather limited fashion-generally
as to misdemeanors and first offenders; gradually it was extended
to more serious offenses.
Probation involved the prime purpose of the state to protect society. But as a part of that purpose, it was thus admitted
by the state that the best protection for society included a wise
plan for the redemption of the individual to society. Experience
had forced upon the state the all too apparent fact that many
persons committed to prison were returned to society as worse
offenders and society thereby became a greater victim because
of a "remedy" that only involved mere punishment of the individual. The very fact that the offender had been a convict
so handicapped him in the process of rehabilitation that its very
discouragement was a prolific cause for his return to crime.
One of the purposes of probation was to spare the offender this
stigma.
The principle of probation as to most cases could be much
better administered through what is known as a criminal court
procedure, providing, of course, that there are no constitutional
or other legal difficulties in the way. Of course many such will
at once suggest themselves.
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I am frank to say that I have not pursued this inquiry to as
great an extent as I am hoping to do, but that my investigations
of the whole subject have gone beyond those made by most of
my brother members of the bar. It has, I am happy to say, enabled .us to indulge in some experimentation through statutes,
providing such a change, already on the statute books of the
state of Colorado-statutes that I believe do not exist as yet in
any other state in this union. These statutes are known asThe Redemption of Offenders Act-Session Laws 1909Pages 478-483, Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921-Sections 65086515.
The civil or chancery court procedure concerning Contributory Dependency and Delinquency, Session' Laws of Colorado
1909, page 336, Compiled Laws of Colorado Sec. 644.
The Colorado Master of Discipline Act, Session Laivs 1909
pages 339-340. Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921, Section 670.
We have had these three so-called Chancery Court Acts in
actual force and effect in Colorado for about sixteen years. So
far no case concerning their legality or constitutionality has
reached the Supreme Court of the state.
The Colorado laws referred to, broadly speaking, came under
that principle of law generally known as parens patriae. I have
sought to translate it as the over-parenthood or super-parenthoodof
the state. This power is frequently referred-to as the power of the
chancery court. :Is this literally true? I doubt it. I think the
confusion comes because it has a powier that legislatures have naturally conferred upon courts having chancery jurisdiction. These
courts proceed to exercise it under the rules, regulations and practice
pertaining to such a court. This is because its purpose is more in
harmony with the chancery courts where the hardships and rigors
of the common law were supposed to be mitigated in the appeal
to the "King's conscience"-now it is the "state's conscience".
Here judges are freer to do equity and justice between all parties
and with reference to the causes and circumstances of each offense regardless of inflexible rules and ancient precedents based
on different conditions of another day.
This power of parens patriae, according to some research on
the question, seems to be a power of the people, residing in its
legislative bodies, to be by them conferred at will upon a court.
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Here it was to be exercised in dealing with children (that included all minors)and among adults, those non compos mentis, or
incapable of caring for themselves, thus always in a large measure irresponsible for their conduct.
Modern research is convincing me that the old test of minority by the chronological age under 21 years is not without
its absurdities. By this fixed standard, the state assumes that
persons under the age of 21, because of their lack of years and
opportunity for the education of experience should not be held
to the same accountability as those over 21, and therefore such
people were generally kown legally as "infants". It was sometimes modified or regulated by statute. In the case of females,
girls of 18 in some states seem to have been assumed, by some
such modifications, to have had more intelligence than boys and
therefore they were exempt from its definitions three years
earlier than the boys-and could deal with property as adults.
As to responsibility for crime, the original common law rule fixing it at seven was by statute raised to ten or even 14 years, in
some states.
This limited and arbitraly test fixed by the chronological
age of 21 in these-days of mental testers, psychologists, psychiatrists and specialists, would seem to be rather absurd. Modem
research has added the mental or psychological age to the chronological age and the I. Q. is as much a part of the case worker's
record in dealing with the individual as *the date shown by the
birth certificate itself. To this has been added the biological or
physiological age which is now being fairly well determined by
certain stigmata and physical development, along with the time
of the first appearance of natural functions-as maturity for example-in either boys or girls. This may vary over a period of
years and have much to do with conduct. To these ages referred to others are being added from time to time, so that the time
may come when the much studied and inspected offender minor
adult may be judged with reference to a number of ages.
Is it not then true that undier the doctrine of parens .,atriaethe application of which has been mostly limited to the state's
regulation of the labor, education, conduct or morals of persons
under 21 years of age, or adult persons non compos mentis, must
now, -in the light of modern science be extended in accord with
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its research and findings? In a measure from one angle, this has
been done in the struggle for legislation such as the eight-hour
employer's liability, accident, compensation, and other social
laws, because it must be conceded that in the unequal contest
between the man who has nothing but his muscles and the man
who has the tools and the capital to control the opportunity for
the use of that muscle, the state must protect the under-dog, as
it were-the one who is not competent to face the unequal struggle of mere contract or barter without this protecting arm of the
state. Such changes are being accepted by the courts, notwithstanding seeming divergence from ancient precedents, just as
they are accepting the changes caused by child welfare legislation. Even the milder and more acceptable class of child welfare
legislation has had to run its gauntlet of opposition from precedent, prejudice, or indifference of some courts and misunderstandings of some judges, and .only after its ups and downs
and often unnecessary amendments to statutes, which if understood should have been sufficient in the first case, is only. gradually coming to be finally accepted and firmly imbedded in our
system of jurisprudence in the more modern struggle for real
justice.
Why may not then, in the light of this more modern'understanding of injustice, make an effort to deal more and more with
the people rather than to be limited merely to the things they
do? May we not confidently hope for an equal acceptance by
the courts of a procedure designed to help, to strengthen, to rehabilitate, to salvage and to save citizenship from its struggle
with modern evils? And may not this be a means first always
to protect society from the mal-conduct of the weak, or vicious,
regardless of age, under what we may, for convenience, call a
chancery court procedure rather than a criminal court procedure? Is it not merely an extension of the state's power of
patens patriae? Why should the state be confined in its use to the
two circumstances heretofore recognized, i. e., (a) the chronological age limit of 21, and (b) a state of non compos mentis,
or in popular terms, children and insane people?
A comparison of types of cases under our earlier criminal
court procedures and under our chancery court procedure will be
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interesting. It may also furnish the best method of explaining
its operation and purposes.
In 1883, there was published in London a very interesting
little volume, called Old Bailey Experiences. The author inWhen I visited
scribed himself "The :Old School-master".
England in 1918 I made some inquiry regarding this book. One
explanation I receiyed for its anonymity was that it was not so
much the modesty of the author as his timidity. It constituted
a severe indictment of Criminal Court methods. Its publication threatened their wrath. The author was a schoolmaster,
not a lawyer. At that time lawyers had too much respect for
the courts to have.indulged in such contemptuous conduct.
One of the cases that excited the old schoolmaster's indignation was a felordy, charge against a young woman. She was
recently a mother. She had attempted to steal a bolt of cloth
from a shop-keeper in Ludgate Street. Mark you-it was an
attempt to steal-. The day after this offense she was hailed before the Old Bailey Court. Here there ensued a rather pathetic
scene. It was the desperate plea of the girl mother to be spared
because of the suckling babe that she carried in her arms. But
it is recorded by the old schoolmaster that his Lordship on the
bench was obdurate to all entreaties for mercy. There had been
much theft by .young women and the shop keepers demanded a
victim. Notwithstanding the rights of the baby to its mother--of
which it was about to be robbed-a far greater robbery than the
attempt to steal the cloth-the mother suffered the penalty attaching to over two hundred crimes at that time. She was taken
at once to Tyburn Prison and there next morning "hanged by
the neck until dead".
A reading of that book over twenty years ago moved me
profoundly. This case involved tremendous issues of justice
and injustice.
The shop-keeper was entitled to his bolt of
cloth. But was not the suckling child entitled to its mother?
Both were innocent of this girl's intended crime and both were
entitled to protection against such weakness. To adjust these
equities the State proceeded to hang the girl. Could savagery
be more absurd? But the majesty of the law and the courts
was entitled to such respect one risked one's liberty to protest.
Then and now, except in Colorado, the state was limited in its
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affections to the man who owned the bolt of cloth. Its laws
permitted not the slightest regard for the baby, entitled to its
mother. This severity of common law criminal procedure of
course was greatly mitigated in these hundred years. But has
it been as much mitigated as we are led to believe? And whatever its mitigation as to severity of mere punishment, what about
the stupidity of its attitude-its methods?
Once I fhced this issue in the case of a young woman whose
case bore striking analogies to this tragedy of the last century.
Her offense also consisted of .pilfering from a shop-keeper. She
was the oldest of the family of six children. Her parents came
to Colorado from a disease-breeding tenement 'district on the
West Side of New York City, There the "mother had contracted
tuberculosis. The hope for relief afforded by Denver's climate
was the lure to our state. The father secured employment in
the engine rooms of one of our utility corporations. Here through
the carelessness of one of his fellow workers, an explosion
occurred. The result was a fatherless family of six. The mother
was already struggling with tuberculosis for the life that was
left to her. All of these things furnished the environment that
made a severer temptation in this girl's life than would have existed in a life where they were lacking. Neverthelss, this gOrl
of our modern times, without friends or money to give bond,
was at once taken to jail. Here she became "the pretty young
shop girl" of a sob story in a newspaper thatcarried her photograph, complete identity, etc. The story made fine copy. It was
death to the girl. After sixty days in jaLil her spirit was so broken, her pride so humbled that she tried to ease her pain by the
river route. By a curious co-incidence, she was rescued by the
police officer who first .arrested her. Thus her life was saved.
But for this act of the same policeman in saving her she would
have shared the fate of her sister offender of nearly a hundred
years before.
Nothing was accomplished by either of these criminal court
procedures except to add to the difficulties of society instead of
correcting them. The state was and still is utterly oblivious to
its own crimes in such cases. One of the crimes was against
the women, the other against those dependent upon them.
Those depending upon such offenders are entitled to their love.
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and support.
None of them had ever committed any crime
against the state. The indictment in both cases should have been
against the sta:te for its own high crime and misdemeanors.
Only ignorance, silly precedent and superstition can account for
such stupidities when with a little thought, care, and consideration for real justice, such a course as that followed by the state
in such cases is wholly unnecessary, either to protect society or
to gain respect for law or jusice. It really does just the opposite.
Now then, under Colorado's more modern procedure in
equity or chancery, the District Attorney is given the right to
consider all the circumstances that have-been here described,
and in the interest of justice, he may elect in such a case to file
a procedure in the Juvenile and Family Court of Denver. Here
this procedure is entitled "THE PEOPLE IN THE INTEREST
OF (MARY JONES)"-not "against Mary Jones"--"UPON
THE PETITION OF (JOHN BROWN) DEPARTMENT
STORE DETECTIVE, PETITIONER, AND CONCERNING
THE DENVER DRY GOODS STORE, RESPONDENT."
The Petition then briefly recites the circumstances of the case,
as have been disclosed by the evidence, prior investigation and
visitation of the probation officer, with references to the cause
of the offense-environment, home conditions, temptations, etc.
etc. It is further recited that in. order that justice may be done
to all parties concerned, and the State may have a chance to
redeem its citizen, as well as to redeem the property of its citizen,
as taken from the Dry Goods Store, the Judge, sitting as a
Chancellor, is asked to take jurisdiction.
Summons, citation or notice is then issued both to the offender Mary Jones, and the victim, the Dry Goods Co. Upon the
motion of the District Attorney, the case then proceeds in the
chancery rather than in the Criminal Court. An affidavit may be
filed, representing to the Court that the offender may, unless apprehended and put under bond, become a fugitive, in which
event, the offender may be placed under bond or, in default thereof, committed to jail. While this right exists I have never known
it to be availed of in a case of this kind. Generally all that is
done is to fix the time for the hearing in the Judge's Chambers.
Here all the parties assemble around the Judge's table in as in-

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

formal fashion as they would in the trial of a child. Seldom, if
ever is a single witness sworn on rule of evidence so much as
thought of. Every one may talk, say what he pleases, so long
as all don't talk at once and we get the absolute truth, which
is rare in criminal cases.
At the time of this hearing, the offender, in whose interest the
procedure is brought, may, refuse to go further upon expressing
a desire not to be bound by any such proceeding, whereupon the
Court shall dismiss it, which merely remands it to the old-time
procedure, or the Court, representing the State, may, after hearing the statement of the District .Attorney, refuse tb accept
jurisdiction and remand the case to the criminal court. Obviously, this has never been done in a case of this kind. The provisions are part of the effort to escape constitutional objections that
might be raised to such procedure. Such provisions concern
the rights of offenders, but not always their best interests.
There is quite a difference between one's legal rights and one's
real interest. Such is the purpose of this new procedure. That
it is successful is already determined. No case under the law
has yet reached the Supreme Court of the State. This is for
the very good reason that the work is almost entirely administrative rather than judicial and is to help people and not to
hurt them. It is preceded by a careful investigation into the causes
of the crime, the particular character of the offense as well as
the individual, with reference solely and exclusively to -each
particular case. It is not bound by anb. laws or rules (as in
Criminal procedures) that govern every case concerning a certain thing the person did, without regard to who the person is,
or why he did it. It is therefore a procedure primarily to help
people, not to hurt them and to do equity and justice by all parties
involved by the act done by an individual whether they are
parties to the procedure or not, that is, the public and -the dependent and innocent children or dependent parents, and the
stockholders of the department store. We have found such victims in their property offenses especially are much more interested in having their property than in having vengeance.

